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EVIDENTIAL PARTICIPLES AND EPISTEMIC VIGILANCE 
Abstract: For communicated contents to be accepted by the audience, they 
have to pass the filters of epistemic vigilance mechanisms, which check the 
credibility and reliability of communicators and the information provided. 
Communicators may lack adequate evidence about the information they 
dispense. One of the ways to indicate to the audience that they are uncertain 
about some information (rather than to put their reputation as reliable 
speakers at risk) is to use participial adjectives, such as ‘alleged’ or 
‘suspected’. The chapter discusses the features of such adjectives and argues 
that they specialise for marking the speaker's epist mic stance towards the 
information communicated –a function they share with other evidentials. 
Unlike many other expressions denoting epistemic stance, however, they 





This chapter focuses on a group of the so-called participial adjectives, 
which seem to modify heads of noun phrases in attributive position 
(Greenbaum and Quirk, 1993; Huddleston, 1993). As opposed to 
prototypical adjectives, participles like the English ‘alleged’ or ‘suspected’, 
or the Spanish ‘supuesto’ or ‘presunto’, do not contribute to the 
propositional content of assertions or claims by providing information about 
the properties or states of the head nouns they co-oc ur with. Instead, they 
work as indicators of the quality of the information communicated about the 
referent of that noun and the communicator’s epistemic stance towards what 
she says.  
In contrast to a variety of linguistic expressions signalling epistemic stance 
towards a whole proposition, the participles under analysis indicate whether 
a fragment of a proposition can be (dis)credited due to lack of adequate 
evidence at the time of speaking or writing. More sp cifically, these 
participles prevent the audience from definitively attributing the agency of 
or the responsibility for some event, action or state of affairs to the referent 
of the noun with which they co-occur, as well as from assigning a certain 
quality or condition to the referent of that noun. Consequently, the audience 
are entitled to assume that further evidence is requi d in order to attribute 
agency, responsibility or a condition to the nominal referent in the (near) 
future. To put it differently, the participial adjectives examined here caution 
the audience that they should not think that, when making a claim, the 
referent of a noun has carried out a certain action or that the state of affairs 
denoted by the noun actually holds true, even if responsibility for such 
action may subsequently be proved or the denoted state of affairs may 
subsequently be found out to hold true. Thus, informers seek to avoid 
derivation of erroneous implications and formation of unwarranted beliefs.  
Many of the actions performed in verbal communication are made evident 
by means of a variety of markers, particles, lexical items or formulaic or 
ritualised expressions. Comprehension of dispensed information may be 
facilitated when communicators indicate the relationships between different 
propositions and guide the audience to the expected cognitive effects 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995; Wilson & Sperber, 1993, 2002a, 2004). 
Expressions exhibiting the communicator’s attitude(s) or feeling(s) towards 
what she says and expressions unveiling, or simply hinting, that the 
communicator (firmly) believes, does not believe or questions some 
information, or that she possesses or lacks sound evidence for it also aid 
interpretation. Stylistic choices, then, end up being fundamental for ensuring 
that the audience arrive at intended meaning and what is said achieves the 
expected effects. As part and parcel of the stylistic decisions that 
communicators constantly make, the participial adjectiv s under analysis are 
added to assertions or claims in an attempt to achieve optimal relevance and 
make the communicator’s informative intention unambiguously manifest. 
This chapter begins by briefly illustrating some of the actions performed 
verbally in Section 2. Next, Section 3 exemplifies the variety of linguistic 
expressions guiding and constraining comprehension. Since among those 
expressions are the past participles alluded to, Section 4 will compare their 
features to those of prototypical participial adjectives, from which they 
differ in some morpho-syntactic aspects. Such differences suggest that those 
past participles make up a group that is specialised for a very specific 
function: assisting the audience in their interpretative task by indicating 
whether they can believe, put into question or discredit the information 
imparted on the basis of available evidence. By so doing, these participles 
share functions with other videntials (Ifantidou, 2001), so here they will be 
labelled evidential participles. Finally, Section 5 discusses their functions 
and contribution to communication.  
 
 
2. Things we do with words 
 
Verbal communication is an incredibly complex activity wherewith and 
wherein a wide array of social and cognitive goals are pursued and fulfilled. 
The foundational works of Speech Act Theory (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) 
made it clear that utterances may not simply describe the world, but also 
perform actions in more or less direct or transparent ways. Among them are 
requesting goods or services (1), congratulating others on their 
achievements (2), complimenting them on, for instance, their appearance 
(3), or apologising for offences or trespasses (4):1  
                                                 
1 See Norrick (1980) and Marandin (1987) for differenc s between compliments and 
congratulations. 
(1) Can/Could you (please) take this parcel to the post-office for me and 
send it? 
(2) Excellent essay! 
(3) I like your new hairdo. 
(4) Sorry I am late! 
Satisfactory accomplishment of those actions requirs determining social 
distance, which interlocutor holds more power because of qualifications, 
skills, personal qualities or position within a particular institution, or if an 
action may involve some cost or benefit to the interlocutors, put them in a 
difficult position or contravene their sociality rights and sociality 
obligations (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Spencer-Oatey, 2008).2 As a result, 
interlocutors constantly make choices regarding what to say and how to say 
it, and formulate utterances in such a way that they give sufficient clues 
about their desire to be considerate or to create, maintain, re-define or 
destroy social relationships in a particular situaton (Arundale, 2006; Locher 
,2006). The request in (1) could be rendered more indirectly if the speaker 
thought that going to the post-office might take threquestee a good while 
or if she wanted to avoid sounding too bossy because she had previously 
asked him other favours: 
                                                 
2 Sociality rights and obligations are those social or personal expectancies or entitlements 
that individuals claim for themselves. Some of them are constantly negotiated, while others 
are culturally or situationally determined beforehand. Individuals expect those rights to be 
respected, so they have expectations which, if unsatisfied, may affect their social 
relationships (Spencer-Oatey, 2008). 
(5) a. Do you think you could take this parcel to the post-office and send it 
for me? 
b. I was wondering whether the post-office might still be open. 
Likewise, if a straightforward congratulation on an unequalled essay (2) was 
perceived as detached, the speaker could elaborate on the reasons why she 
praises it as a way of empathising with the hearer nd making it clear that 
she intends to praise his work (Norrick, 1980; Marandin, 1987): 
(6) Excellent essay! It addresses most of the current challenges in 
relevance-theoretic pragmatics. 
Not knowing another person well may render complimenting risky, as the 
complimentee may think that the complimenter simply seeks to comply with 
rules of etiquette, is flattering or even making fun of him (Wolfson, 1983; 
Holmes & Brown, 1987). That riskiness is avoided by means of a more 
indirect formulation which evidences that the compli enter has noticed a 
change in the complimentee but does not unveil her real opinion about it: 
(7) It seems that you’ve been to the hairdresser’s.  
If a recurrent formula to apologise (4) is thought to sound insincere, the 
speaker may want to show true regret by adding the reasons for the apology: 
(8) There was a huge traffic jam and I could not make it on time for class. 
Dispensing information other people might need or have an interest in 
impacts their set of beliefs. These may be altered by adducing evidence that 
certain facts or states of affairs hold or that some of them should be 
abandoned. Thus, people attempt to convince others of facts or states of 
affairs, to persuade them to do certain things or believe specific issues, or 
even to manipulate them.  
Since information may be true or false, when imparting it individuals are 
normally interested in appearing competent –i.e. skilled communicators and 
knowledgeable about specific issues– and benevolent –i.e. reliable or 
trustworthy informers (Sperber, 1994). Grice (1975) himself captured the 
intuition that communicators are usually expected to tell the truth or that 
telling it is beneficial for communication in his ‘Maxim of Quality’.3 
Benevolence causes speakers to indicate certainty or lack of evidence about 
information by means of various stylistic choices. For example, if an 
individual wants to communicate that it actually is or may be cloudy in 
Seville at a specific time, she can opt for any of the formulations below in 
order to present her degree of certainty or the kind of evidence she relies on: 
(9) a. It is cloudy in Seville now. 
b. It must be cloudy in Seville now. 
c. It may be cloudy in Seville now. 
d. It might be cloudy in Seville now. 
e. They say that it could be cloudy in Seville now. 
f. I have (just) heard that it is cloudy in Seville now. 
 
 
                                                 
3 See Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995), Wilson (1995) and Wilson & Sperber (2002b) for 
arguments against this maxim and the cooperative principle. 
3. Style and relevance 
 
Comprehension normally follows the path of least cognitive effort and 
maximum cognitive benefit. The human mind carries out a process of 
mutual parallel adjustment that mobilises a series of mechanisms or 
modules that perform a number of simultaneous tasks (Carston, 2002). 
Among them are decoding, inferring, mindreading, emotion-reading or 
assessing the veracity and reliability of information (Wilson, 2012).4  
Decoding yields an organised set of conceptual representations (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1986/1995, p. 72). Inference enables segmentatio  of sounds and 
identification of words, parsing and disambiguation of syntactic 
constituents, assignment of reference, adjustment of the conceptual content 
of some words, and recovery of ellipsed material. The output of these tasks 
is the lower-level explicature of an utterance, or a fully propositional form 
whose truthfulness or falsity can be verified.  
Inference, mindreading and emotion-reading work jointly in order to 
construct a description of the speech act that the speaker is thought to 
accomplish, the attitude that she is considered to have towards what she says 
or her degree of certainty about it: the igher-level explicatures (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1995, pp. 181-182). Finally, inference makes it possible to relate 
the content of an utterance to assumptions that the audience have evidence 
                                                 
4 As opposed to cognitivists, relevance theory endorses the massive modularity thesis, 
which conceives of the human mind as a complex set of specialised and mandatory 
mechanisms. 
to think that the speaker expected them to supply –implicated premises– so 
as to arrive at an intended implicated content –implicated conclusions 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995; Wilson & Sperber, 200a, 2004). 
The fast pace at which these tasks are performed and psychological and 
physiological factors –e.g. tiredness, absent-minded ess, multi-tasking, 
drowsiness, etc.– often negatively affect their output. In fact, on many 
occasions the audience experience problems at disamb guating constituents, 
assigning reference or constructing higher-level explicatures, miss 
implicatures or arrive at unintended ones (Yus Ramos, 1999a, 1999b; 
Padilla Cruz, 2013). In order to ensure correct understanding, 
communicators may guide the audience by means of linguistic or expressive 
choices, i.e. style.  
Within relevance-theoretic pragmatics stylistic choi es are seen as resulting 
from the communicator’s willingness to be optimally relevant and assist 
comprehension (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995, p. 219; Trotter, 1992, p. 11). 
The presumption of optimal relevance that every utterance communicates 
entails that the utterance will be worth the audience’s effort to process it and 
that it is worded in the most effort-saving way, depending on the speaker’s 
abilities and preferences (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 270).5 Indeed, 
speakers always make decisions on issues such as the structure or level of 
                                                 
5 The notion of ‘abilities’ refers to the cognitive skills and capabilities underlying linguistic 
performance, while that of ‘preferences’ alludes to a variety of goals, such as complying 
with norms of politeness or norms dictating the type or amount of information to impart, to 
whom, how, when and where to present it, etc. (Mazzarella, 2013, pp. 33-35).   
formality of their contributions and take advantage of the repertoire of their 
language in order to assist the audience in their inte pretative tasks.  
In (1) above, interrogative syntax, a conventionalised formula (‘can/could 
you + verb’) and the illocutionary force indicating device (Levinson, 1983) 
‘please’ favour a requestive interpretation and rule out an interpretation as a 
question about the hearer’s physical abilities. Exclamative syntax and the 
structure ‘adjective + noun’ facilitate an interpretation of (2) as a 
congratulation –provided the appropriate paralanguage accompanies it. 
Quite similarly, a structure such as ‘I like’ followed by a direct object 
contributes to the interpretation of (3) as a compli ent (Wolfson & Manes, 
1980; Manes & Wolfson, 1981). In the case of (4), the occurrence of ‘sorry’ 
renders the apology interpretation almost automatic. Had the speaker wanted 
to avoid sounding insincere or felt that a more indirect formulation like (8) 
could be misinterpreted, she could also have resortd to an explicit 
performative: 
(10) I apologise for being late to class. 
Although probably costlier in terms of processing effort, alternative, more 
verbose formulations like (5-8) often give the audience evidence of the 
speakers’ intention to communicate w ak implicatures about, for example, 
how she treats them or their social relationship (Sperber & Wilson, 
1986/1995). Derivation of those implicatures involves additional, beneficial 
cognitive effects (Escandell Vidal, 1998) of a social or behavioural nature 
(Jary, 2013; see also Haugh, 2014), which could not be obtained by means 
of other stylistic choices. Indeed, more elaborate and verbose formulations 
sometimes get marked as opposed to expected, default ones –which would 
be unmarked– and give the audience reason to suspect the speaker’s 
intention to make (more) manifest assumptions about her considerateness or 
politeness (Jary, 1998, p. 9). 
Relevance theorists have extensively shown that speakers assist the 
construction of interpretative hypotheses by means of a rich variety of 
linguistic resources. For instance, discourse markers indicate the 
relationships between specific propositions; their procedural meaning steers 
mental computations in one direction or another by imposing constraints on 
the type of inferential process needed (Blakemore, 1987, 2002; Jucker, 
1993; Moeschler, 1993; Wilson & Sperber, 1993; Rouch ta, 1995). 
Accordingly, a marker like ‘so’ encodes the instrucion that two 
propositions must be connected by a relation of cause and effect:6 
(11) Mark came to Seville. So he visited the cathedral and the Alcázar. 
Attitudinal adverbials (e.g. ‘happily’, ‘sadly’, ‘unfortunately’, etc.), 
interjections (e.g. ‘oh!’, ‘wow!’, etc.), intonation and paralanguage help 
infer the speaker’s attitude towards the proposition expressed. While 
intonation and paralanguage have been argued to be purely procedural 
elements (Imai, 1998; Wilson & Wharton, 2006; Wharton, 2009), attitudinal 
adverbials have been claimed to encode a conceptual content, even if it does 
                                                 
6 According to Carston (2016), the various contributions on connectives or discourse 
markers made after Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) influential work may be considered the first 
stage in the development of the notion of procedural meaning. 
not contribute to the lower-level explicature of an utterance, but to its 
higher-level explicature (Ifantidou, 1992). Interjections would make up a 
hybrid category that includes elements that may be placed along a cline 
ranging from purely procedural elements to more conceptual ones (Wharton, 
2003, 2009):7 
(12) Unfortunately, Mark could not come to Seville this year. 
(13) Wow! Mark has come to Seville. 
Expressive possibilities enable speakers to reformulate tterances with a 
view to ensuring correct understanding. Reformulations have been argued to 
constrain interpretative routes and enable exploration of the encyclopaedic 
entries of lexical items (Blakemore, 1992, 1993, 1994):8 
(14)  Mark visited the Alcázar in Seville. In other words, he visited the 
oldest inhabited royal residence in Europe. 
Concerning presentation of information, relevance theorists have also 
argued that the so-called illocutionary adverbials (e.g. ‘frankly’, ‘seriously’, 
etc.), evidential adverbials (e.g. ‘obviously’, ‘evidently’, ‘clearly’, etc.), 
hearsay adverbials (e.g. ‘allegedly’, ‘reportedly’, etc.) and some 
parenthetical expressions (e.g. ‘they say’, ‘I hear’, etc.) indicate possession 
or lack of supportive evidence for information. These elements show the 
informer’s different degrees of commitment to the proposition expressed or 
                                                 
7 See Padilla Cruz (2009) for comments on Wharton’s (2003, 2009) relevance-theoretic 
analysis of interjections. The relevance-theoretic analyses of elements contributing to 
attitudinal descriptions are part of the second stage in the development of the notion of 
procedural meaning (Carston 2016). 
 
8 For a different view and criticism, see Culpeper (1994). 
whether the information dispensed is considered true, false, reliable or in 
need of further evidence (Ifantidou, 1992, 1993, 2001; Wilson & Sperber, 
1993; Wilson, 1999):  
(15) Frankly, Mark visited the Alcázar in Seville. 
(16) Clearly, Mark enjoyed the Alcázar. 
(17) Allegedly, Mark came to Seville and visited the Alcázar. 
(18) a. I hear that Mark did not enjoy the Alcázar. 
b. Mark did not enjoy the Alcázar, I hear. 
c. Mark, I hear, did not enjoy the Alcázar. 
Similar functions are fulfilled by the indicative mood (9a), the various 
modal verbs (9b-9d) and the reporting verbs (9e-9f). In Japanese, the 
utterance-final hearsay particle ‘-tte’ is employed with the same purposes 
(Itani, 1994, 1998), while in Sissala ‘ré’ is normally inserted in reported 
speech or thought, or after speech-act and propositional-attitude verbs 
corresponding to ‘think’, ‘believe’ or ‘know’ (Blass, 1989, 1990).  
English and Spanish also resort to past participles that seem to work 
similarly. In a genre like journalism, where professional ethics encourages 
objective presentation of facts, clear indication of the source(s) of evidence 
and unambiguous reference to the veracity of information (Stovall, 2004; 
Meyers, 2010; Rich, 2015), headlines often attempt to draw readers’ 
attention with texts like these: 
(19) Brother of alleged Holly Bobo killer arrested for disposing of evidenc . 
(www.mydailynews.com 19/09/2014) 
(20) Cops release images of waitress’s alleged killer. 
(www.kaieteurnewsonline.com 7/09/2014) 
(21) Boy suspected kidnapper dead after Colorado hostage standoff. 
(www.reuters.com 5/08/2014) 
(22) Update: Suspected kidnapper arrested after crashing car. 
(www.racinecontyeye.com 22/07/2014) 
(23) Detenido el supuesto homicida de una mujer en un coto en Coria. 
(Sevilla) (www.lavanguardia.com 22/09/2014) 
Suspected killer of woman in reserve in Coria (Seville) arrest d. 
(24) El supuesto homicida de El Atazar ahogó y acuchilló a su exmujer. 
(www.elmundo.com 9/08/2011) 
Suspected El Atazar killer choked and stabbed ex-wife. 
(25) Alaya cifra en 855 millones el presunto fraude de los ERE en Andalucía 
(www.lasexta.com 15/08/2014) 
Judge Alaya values presumed ERE fraud in Andalusia in 855 millions. 
The English past participles ‘alleged’ and ‘suspected’ and the Spanish 
equivalents ‘supuesto’ and ‘presunto’ in these examples do not denote any 
temporary, accidental or permanent feature or stateof the referent of the 
nouns they accompany, so they cannot be regarded as proper modifying 
adjectives. Rather, they suggest that the individuals referred to as ‘killers’ or 
‘kidnapper’, and the action labelled ‘fraud’, are not yet to be definitely 
considered or believed as such at a particular time, as ach of them might 
still be under judicial investigation or in need of such investigation. In fact, 
in countries like Spain, laws seek to guarantee, protect and respect 
individuals’ right to a presumption of innocence, so potential criminals and 
crimes must not be properly regarded as such until e ough evidence is 
found, adduced or provided by witnesses or investigation, and the court or 
judge announces a sentence. These participles hint that the referents of the 
pre-modified nouns could be referred to in a particular way or attributed 
specific properties –being a killer or kidnapper, or fraudulence– in the (near) 
future as a result of discovery of subsequent supporting evidence which, at 
the time of writing, is still non-existent or unconfirmed. 
Participial adjectives are past participles that appear as adnominal modifiers 
of nouns (Huddleston, 1988, 1993; Greenbaum and Quirk, 1993). 
Prototypical participial adjectives denote qualities or states of the modified 
nouns, so they are included as members of the category of adjectives. Like 
other grammatical categories incorporating lexical items from other 
categories, that of adjectives is an open one which, in addition to some 
adverbs and nouns modifying nominal heads, also groups de-verbal items 
like present and past participles.  
Clearly, the past participles above (19-25) do not w rk as proper participial 
adjectives. Not only do they not denote qualities or tates of a noun, but also 




4. Properties of prototypical participial adjectives 
 
Many past participles in English or Spanish have adj ctival functions and 
share some of the general properties characteristic of central or core 
adjectives (Huddleston, 1988, pp. 108-110; Haegeman & Guéron, 1999, pp. 
56-57, 71-72; Collins & Hollo, 2000, pp. 80-81; Börjars & Burridge, 2001, 
pp. 64-65): 
a) Occurrence in adnominal positions either before the head noun and after 
the determiner (attributive position), as in English, or after the head 
noun (postpositive position), as in Spanish:9 
(26) a. A broken chair. 
b. Una silla rota. 
(27) a. The worried person. 
b. La persona preocupada. 
(28) a. The greatest record broken. 
b. El mayor record (jamás) batido. 
b) Occurrence in predicative position as subject complement in attributive 
sentences (29) or as object complement (30): 
(29) a. The chair is broken. 
b. La silla está rota. 
(30) a. He considered the man worried. 
                                                 
9 While in Spanish this seems to be the average or dfault position for adjectives, in English 
this position is restricted to adjectives ending in ‘-able’  or ‘ -ible’ when the head noun is 
modified by another adjective in the superlative or other modifiers. 
b. Consideró al hombre preocupado. 
c) Pre-modification by intensifiers: 
(31) a. He was very worried. 
b. (Él) Estaba muy preocupado. 
c. The chair was utterly destroyed. 
d. La silla estaba completamente destrozada. 
d) Gradability, i.e. comparative and superlative forms: 
(32) a. He was more shocked than surprised. 
b. (Él) Estaba más impactado que sorprendido. 
(33) a. He was the most surprised person in the room. 
b. (Él) Era la persona más sorprendida de la sala. 
When used attributively, participial adjectives usually have a passive 
meaning that can be captured by an equivalent defining relative clause:  
(34) a. The offended man > The man who/that was offended. 
b. El hombre ofendido > El hombre que ha sido ofendido. 
c. Lost property > The property that has been lost.
d. Propiedad perdida > La propiedad que ha sido perdida. 
The passive reading, nevertheless, is ruled out when the corresponding verb 
is intransitive: 
(35) a. The departed train > The train that (has/had) depart d. 
b. El difunto marido > El marido que ha fallecido. 
c. The escaped prisoner > The prisoner who (has/had) escaped. 
d. El prisionero huido > El prisionero que ha huido. 
Predicative position, in contrast, is only permitted for some participles: 
(36) a. The curtains are faded > The curtains have faded. 
b. Las cortinas están desteñidas > Las cortinas han desteñido. 
c. He is now retired > He has now retired. 
d. (Él) Ahora está jubilado > (Él) Ahora se ha jubilado. 
Like prototypical adjectives, participial adjectives contribute to the 
proposition expressed. Replacement with another participle or adjective 
changes sentence meaning. Replacement with a defining relative clause does 
not alter the propositional content, although the resulting sentence differs in 
terms of syntactic structure (34). In relevance-theoretic terms, participial 
adjectives can therefore be said to encode a conceptual content that 
contributes to the lower-level explicatures of utterances and affects their 
truth conditions (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995; Wilson & Sperber, 2002, 
2004).  
Despite their attributive position, the adjectival status of the participial 
adjectives in the headlines in the previous section (19-25) is dubious. 
Neither can they be intensified (37), nor do they sem to have comparative 
or superlative forms (38-39): 
(37) a. *The brother of very alleged Holly Bobo killer. 
b. *Very suspected kidnapper arrested.10 
c. *Detenido el muy supuesto homicida. 
                                                 
10 Note, however, that these participial adjectives can be modified by adverbs such as 
‘widely’. 
d. *El muy presunto fraude de los ERE. 
(38) a. *He was more alleged than suspected. 
b. *(Él) Era más presunto que supuesto  
(39) a. *He was the most alleged killer (in the room). 
b. *(Él) era el homicida más supuesto (de la sala). 
Also, placing those participles in predicative positi n yields a bizarre 
sentence: 
(40) a. *The killer is alleged. 
b. *El homicida es presunto. 
Furthermore, although the corresponding verbs of the English participles are 
transitive and, consequently, would allow for a passive transformation, 
substitution with a passive form results in an odd sentence:  
(41) a. *The killer who/that is/was alleged. 
b. *El homicida que es/fue presunto. 
Even if ‘allege’ is transitive, the person alleged to have done something is 
not its direct object, so a sentence like (42) would be ungrammatical: 
(42) *The police alleged him.  
Passivisation could only be licensed if the participles were followed or 
complemented by an infinitival clause: 
(43) The man who/that is/was alleged/suspected to have committed three 
crimes. 
Substitution of the participles of the Spanish verbs ‘suponer’ or ‘presumir’ 
with a passive form would not be very common or natural either. Despite a 
certain preference for impersonal structures with ‘se’ as a subject slot-filler 
–‘se supone’, ‘se presume’– if the Spanish participles of these verbs were 
substituted with impersonal forms, they would subcategorise a finite 
complement clause introduced by the complementiser ‘qu ’, which 
functions as their direct object: 
(44) El hombre que se supone/presume que ha cometido tres crímenes. 
Failure to share the properties of prototypical participial adjectives suggests 
that the past participles analysed in this work may constitute a sub-type in 
their own right specialised for fulfilling a specifi  function: informing about 
the communicator’s evidence when making an assertion. In this respect, 
these past participles work as evidentials and their insertion in utterances is 
intended to achieve specific perlocutionary effects: whether the audience 
should take with a pinch of salt, question or not yet completely believe a 
claim or assertion made because of lack of the pertinent evidence (Wilson, 
2012; Piskorska, 2016). 
  
 
5. On the evidential function of some past participles  
 
Some modals verbs (e.g. ‘may’, ‘must’, ‘should’), adjectives (e.g. ‘able’, 
‘possible’) and clausal elements (e.g. ‘I think’, ‘they say’) have often been 
considered devices to express modality (Palmer, 1986, 2001). Modality 
must be distinguished from verbal features such as mood, tense and aspect, 
which are realised by inflections in many languages, b cause “[…] it does 
not refer directly to any characteristic of the event […]” presented in a 
proposition, “[…] but simply to the status of the pro osition” (Palmer, 2001, 
p. 1). As Huddleston (1993, pp. 165-166) states, modality is “[…] a rather 
broad term for […] a category of meaning”.  
Traditionally, grammarians have differentiated two kinds of modality:  
(i) Epistemic –from the Ancient Greek word for ‘knowledge’ 
(Huddleston, 1993, p. 166)– which is related to the status of a 
proposition as true, false, probable, possible, necessary, etc., 
depending on what the speaker knows. This kind of modality is also 
known as extrinsic because there is a “[…] human judgement of 
what is or is not likely to happen” and seen as more objective 
(Greenbaum & Quirk, 1993, p. 60). 
(ii)  Deontic –from the Ancient Greek word alluding to the notion of 
‘binding’– which has to do with how the speaker presents an action, 
i.e. as obligatory, permitted, advisable, etc. (Huddleston, 1993, pp. 
167-168). This kind of modality is also labelled intrinsic because 
some “[…] human control over events” is involved and is seen as 
more subjective (Greenbaum & Quirk, 1993, p. 60).  
The so-called epistemic modals have more recently been re-analysed as 
conveying information about the speaker’s attitude(s) towards the 
propositional content communicated. Among those attitudes are, for 
instance, strong (dis)belief in, (un)certainty about r (non-)commitment to 
the truth of the propositional content of an assertion.  
Modality must be distinguished from evidentiality, a linguistic category 
“[…] whose primary meaning is source of information” (Aikhenvald, 2004, 
p. 3) and refers to the speaker’s indication of her degree of commitment to a 
claim depending on available evidence (Crystal, 1991, p. 127). Such 
indication is motivated by the source(s) of the information taken into 
account when communicating (Dendale & Tasmowski, 2001), which may 
be perceptual or epistemological (Cornillie, 2007, p. 45): visual, non-visual 
but directly perceived, informed by perceptual clues, assumed via testimony, 
etc. (Aikhenvald, 2004). Since the source(s) of information may be more or 
less reliable or trustworthy (Matthews, 2007), evidntiality is the indication 
of the origin(s) of the knowledge on which the speaker bases her 
assertion(s) about (a) particular state(s) of affairs, or of the compatibility of 
that/those state(s) of affairs with her own universe of beliefs (Nuyts, 2006, 
p. 10). 
Stylistic choices lead to optimally relevant interpretations, but those 
interpretations need not be reliable or credible. In effect, informers do not 
always behave benevolently because they may attempt to deceive or 
misguide the audience, or competently because they may lack adequate 
evidence when imparting information. In relevance-th oretic pragmatics, 
linguistic expressions like evidential and hearsay adverbials, parenthetical 
elements or hearsay particles have been analysed as in icators of the sort of 
evidence communicators rely on and are subsumed under the umbrella term 
evidentials (Ifantidou, 2001). Evidentials have been claimed to indicate 
whether the audience should believe, discredit or be cautious about 
dispensed information. They have been argued to trigge  the construction of 
(more) sophisticated higher-level explicatures thatinclude some indication 
of the speaker’s degree of (un)certainty about the communicated content or 
the evidence she relies on when making an assertion: 
(45) a. The speaker (strongly/firmly) believes that p. 
b. The speaker is (very) certain/uncertain that p. 
Relevance theorists posit that the human mind has developed a complex set 
of specialised mechanisms for monitoring the believability and reliability of 
informers –i.e. the source(s) of information– and the information that they 
supply –i.e. the content itself. Those mechanisms take into account a variety 
of internal and external factors that determine whether a person and the 
information she provides should be trusted (Origgi, 2013) and trigger an 
attitude of epistemic vigilance (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009; Sperber et al., 
2010). Following Wilson (2012, 2016), the past participles on which this 
chapter focuses could be considered, like other evident als, to fulfil an 
important function: activating and assisting epistemic vigilance mechanisms 
in their assessments of the trustworthiness of informers and information. 
Accordingly, the participles in question could have become specialised for 
targeting epistemic vigilance mechanisms by alerting hem to the likely 
veracity or falsity of claims due to lack of evidenc . 
 
5.1. Evidentials and epistemic vigilance 
 
Informers and information deserve trust to a greater or lesser extent. People 
have epistemic confidence in other individuals and assign or deprive them of 
epistemic trustworthiness (Fricker, 2007). Research in developmental 
psychology has revealed that between the ages of two and three, children 
develop a sensibility towards individuals and what t ey say. As a result, 
children can determine the veracity or falsity of information, can contradict 
or correct assertions they consider false or questionable, and seem to prefer 
individuals whom they regard as benevolent and competent on the basis of 
past personal experiences and what other people tell them about those 
individuals (Clément et al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2007; Heyman, 2008; 
Corriveau & Harris, 2009). These findings lend support to the idea that the 
human mind comprises a cluster of varied mechanisms specialised for 
discriminating the trustworthiness or reliability of informants and of 
information.  
Epistemic vigilance mechanisms take into account a variety of sources of 
trust (Origgi, 2013, pp. 227-233) which cause an individual to think of 
others and what they claim or assert in a particular way: 
a. Beliefs and prejudices about an informer’s reliability accrued from prior 
exchanges. 
b. The relevance of what is said. 
c. Internalised social norms of complying with authorities or experts in 
some domain or issues. 
d. The informer’s socially distributed reputation as an informant. 
e. Signals that unveil knowledge/ignorance about or possession/lack of 
evidence for specific issues: hesitation, stuttering, odd syntax, 
rephrasing, difficulties at finding appropriate words, or particles, 
adverbials and clausal elements like those presented above. 
f. Emotional reactions biasing the conclusions derived about the informer: 
affect, anger, wrath, etc. 
g. Moral commitments determining whether the hearer should actually 
think of the informer in a particular way. 
These sources cause epistemic vigilance mechanisms to trigger a certain 
alertness or critical stance towards informers and information (Sperber et al., 
2010, p. 363). These mechanisms do not automatically generate distrust, but 
a critical attitude that differs from blind, naïve and uncritical trust (Sperber 
et al. 2010; Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Sperber & Mercier, 2012). Such an 
attitude empowers individuals to move from a positin of indiscriminate 
trust, in which credibility is almost automatically given to beliefs or states 
of affairs, or another position of gullible trust, where information is believed 
even if it contradicts previous personal observations, to one of sceptical 
trust (Clément et al., 2004, pp. 361-363). In this last position, information 
and the implications following from it are not uncriti ally believed, above 
all if the informer has proved unreliable beforehand or the information is 
perceived not to have been duly supported by pertinen  evidence. In so 
doing, vigilance mechanisms safeguard individuals against some of the 
possible risks of communication: deception and misinformation. 
Epistemic vigilance mechanisms may not always be effective, as they may 
be weakly activated (Michaelian, 2013, p. 42). Their d fault state, according 
to Sperber (2013, p. 64), is one of moderate activation. However, 
individuals raise their activation “[…] by a closer inspection of data, 
sometimes interrogating [themselves] about the sources of [their] trust or 
distrust, and sometimes by refining [their] cognitive heuristics” (Origgi, 
2013, p. 224). When vigilance is raised, individuals become actively 
vigilant and their alertness to the quality of information increases. Active or 
strong vigilance involves (Origgi, 2013, p. 226-227): 
i. External vigilance or ‘looking outward’, so to say, in order to become 
aware of the operating cultural norms and contextual elements (e.g. 
preceding discourse, paralanguage, elements in the communicative 
situation, etc.) that determine allocation or deprival of trust to 
information. 
ii.  Internal vigilance or ‘looking inward’, so to say, by scrutinising the 
interpretative steps taken, the cognitive tasks performed, the beliefs 
used when contextualising information and the conclusions reached. 
Raised vigilance is fundamental for maintaining a necessary critical stance 
on the biases, social pressures and prejudices that migh  affect thinking. 
Indeed, an actively vigilant attitude facilitates awareness of the reasons why 
trust is allocated to interlocutors and information.  
Informants may also contribute to the activation of vigilance mechanisms or 
assist them in their decisions about whether to believ  or discredit 
information and/or informers through stylistic decisions. In addition to the 
elements exemplified in Section 3, relevance theorists have also recently 
paid attention to some quotatives in languages like Estonian or Sissala, 
which are exploited in narratives and argumentation in order to aid vigilance 
mechanisms in their tasks (Unger, 2016). In fact, in he case of 
argumentation more specifically, convincing the audience of some fallacies 
may be a matter of bypassing the filters of vigilance mechanisms (Oswald, 
2011, 2016).11  
The past participles discussed in this chapter seem to fulfil a similar 
assistive function for epistemic vigilance mechanisms. In a similar way to 
hearsay particles, hearsay and evidential adverbials, p renthetical 
expressions and some main verbs (Ifantidou, 1992, 193, 2001; Itani, 1994, 
1998; Wilson & Sperber, 1993; Wilson, 1999), those participles indicate 
whether an informer has (sound) evidence to consider that a part of a claim 
she makes actually holds true at the moment of speaking. In other words, 
those participles indicate that the way in which an event, state of affairs or 
                                                 
11 In some types of jokes, vigilance mechanisms would detect if the comprehension module 
has been fooled into granting plausibility to an interpretative hypothesis that appears 
optimally relevant but is inadequate (Padilla Cruz, 2012), while in puns vigilance 
mechanisms would detect that ambiguous words or fragments are not correctly 
disambiguated (Padilla Cruz, 2015). 
individual are labelled, characterised or alluded to in an assertion should not 
necessarily be taken for granted. Thus, those participles additionally prevent 
the audience from giving credibility to implications likely to be derived 
from the claim made at the time of speaking.  
Consider assertions or claims like (46) and (48), from which implications 
like (47) and (49) may respectively be drawn: 
(46) Suspected woman kidnapper arrested after car crash. 
(47) a. Someone will be sentenced to prison. 
b. Someone might have to pay compensation. 
(48) Judge values presumed fraud in 855 millions. 
(49) a. Someone is a robber. 
b. Someone will be sent to prison. 
c. Someone will have to return stolen money. 
d. Someone should not have public responsibilities. 
The participles in (46) and (48) unveil that the informer has not accrued the 
requisite evidence to be certain at the time of speaking about the veracity of 
a likely state of affairs mentioned in those assertions or claims –namely, that 
a particular person has actually kidnapped a woman or that someone has 
really committed monetary fraud– or that the evidence for regarding 
someone or some events in a particular way is not completely reliable. Thus, 
these participles caution the audience against deriving and crediting certain 
implications (47, 49). Those participles alert vigilance mechanisms to the 
potential (im)plausibility of a state of affairs mentioned in a claim or 
assertion, as well as to its likelihood to be (un)trustworthy.  
The morpho-syntactic peculiarities of those participles suggest that, in 
contrast to standard pre-modifying past participles, languages like English 
or Spanish might have dedicated them to activate epistemic vigilance 
mechanisms or raise the activation of these mechanisms in case they are 
weakly activated or ‘dormant’, so to say. This is es ential for these 
mechanisms to detect informers’ trustworthiness or certainty about claims or 
assertions they make. Raised activation of these mechanisms results in 
external vigilance, which prompts an audience to search for additional 
evidence that backs them up in believing or discrediting a state(s) of affairs 
alluded to in a claim or assertion, or wait for thenecessary evidence to be 
adduced.  
Due to these functions, past participles like English ‘alleged’ or ‘suspected’ 
and Spanish ‘presunto’ or ‘supuesto’ could be termed evidential participles 
and be described as ‘alerters’ of epistemic vigilance mechanisms to the 
credibility or likelihood of a state of affairs mentioned in a claim or 
assertion. Evidential participles indicate whether t  audience are entitled to 
believe, discredit or take with a grain of salt a part or fragment of what an 
informant says, and to draw and believe possible implications ensuing from 
it. Even though evidential participles share the functions described above 
with other evidential expressions, their pre-modifying position right before 
the modified head noun seems to suggest that they work slightly differently. 
 
5.2. What evidential participles communicate  
 
One of the most significant contributions of relevance-theoretic pragmatics 
has been its distinction between conceptual and procedural expressions 
(Blakemore, 1987, 1992, 2004; Wilson and Sperber, 1993, 2002a, 2004; 
Carston, 2016; Wilson, 2016). While the former encode representations that 
may become constituents of lower-level explicatures and, therefore, affect 
the truth-conditional content of utterances, the latter encode instructions 
steering processing and comprehension. Typical examples of purely 
conceptual expressions are nouns, verbs, adjectives or adverbs, while typical 
examples of purely procedural expressions are discour e markers.  
The conceptual-procedural distinction is not a clear-cut one, nonetheless: 
not all conceptual expressions contribute to lower-level explicatures and, 
therefore, to the truth-conditional content of utterances, and some 
procedures may be encoded by expressions with a conceptual nature 
(Wilson & Sperber, 1993). There are conceptual exprssions that contribute 
to higher-level explicatures by constraining their construction; for instance, 
illocutionary, attitudinal and evidential adverbials.12 On the other hand, 
some procedural expressions may encode some sort of conceptual content, 
even if schematic; for example, personal pronouns.  
                                                 
12 See Ifantidou (1992, 1993) for a discussion of different tests for truth-conditionality to 
these expressions, such as insertion in conditional r disjunctive structures. 
Evidential participles seem to be conceptual and to contribute to the 
proposition expressed. If they are removed or replaced with an adjective or 
another past participle, the meaning of the resulting assertion and its truth 
conditions change:  
(50) a. Alleged/Suspected killer arrested. 
b. Killer arrested. 
c. Handsome killer arrested. 
(51) a. Presunto/supuesto homicida arrestado. 
b. Homicida arrestado. 
c. Apuesto homicida arrestado. 
In the first sentence of these two examples, the speaker claims that someone 
who must (still) be suspected to be a killer due to lack of contrary evidence 
has been arrested. In the second sentence, the speaker asserts that a person 
who definitely is a killer has been arrested. In the t ird sentence, the speaker 
informs about the arrest of a killer who is characterised by a particular 
feature. The evidential participle, therefore, contributes to the lower-level 
explicature of the utterance. 
Evidential participles have hearsay adverbial counterparts like English 
‘allegedly’ and ‘supposedly’ (52) and Spanish ‘supuestamente’ and 
‘presuntamente’ (53). These adverbials, which are respectively derived from 
the transitive verbs ‘to allege’ and ‘to suppose’ in the case of English, and 
from ‘suponer’ and ‘presumir’ in that of Spanish, may be placed in distinct 
positions. Note that, if the corresponding English verb is passivised, it 
subcategorises an infinitival clause (54). Spanish, in contrast, prefers an 
impersonal form followed by a finite complement clause that is introduced 
by the complementiser ‘que’ and functions as the dir ct object (55):  
(52) a. Allegedly, the killer was sent to prison. 
b. The killer was, allegedly, sent to prison. 
c. The killer was sent to prison, allegedly. 
(53) a. Supuestamente, el homicida fue enviado a prisión. 
b. El homicida fue, supuestamente, enviado a prisión. 
c. El homicida fue enviado a prisión, supuestamente. 
(54) The killer is alleged to have been sent to prison. 
(55) Su supone que el homicida fue enviado a prisión. 
However, what the speaker reports by means of assertions containing 
hearsay adverbials (52, 53) differs from what she claims with assertions 
containing evidential participles: 
(56) a. The alleged killer was sent to prison. 
b. El supuesto homicida fue enviado a prisión. 
In (52) and (53) the speaker communicates her uncertainty about or lack of 
strong evidence concerning the fact that someone, who can definitely be 
regarded as a killer, was actually sent to prison. In (56) the speaker asserts 
that someone, who cannot yet be considered a killerbecause of lack of 
backing evidence, was certainly imprisoned. Therefore, while hearsay 
adverbials indicate the weakness of the informer’s belief in, certainty about 
or commitment to a whole proposition, evidential participles only unveil the 
weakness of her belief in, certainty about or commit ent to a state of affairs 
alluded to in an assertion by means of one of its constituents: a noun phrase. 
Obviously, the hearer of an utterance like (56) may think that the speaker, 
upon using the evidential participle, also intends to ubtly invite an 
implicature to the effect that she hopes or expects –or that it is hoped or 
expected– that confirming evidence will come to light. 
The fact that hearsay adverbials and evidential participles affect what an 
informer claims in differing ways is attested by distinct tests. Firstly, 
hearsay adverbials are not properly integrated into the syntax of an assertion 
or claim. They are separated from it by a pause in speech and a comma in 
writing, thus constituting an independent tone-unit. Moreover, they may be 
freely placed before or after the assertion/claim, or in the middle of it. 
However, evidential participles occupy a fixed positi n as pre-modifiers of a 
nominal head. 
Secondly, substitution of hearsay adverbials by their corresponding verbs 
followed by a clause acting as direct object is possible. For evidential 
participles to be replaced by their corresponding verbs, it would be 
necessary to use a defining relative clause. In English, that clause would 
have a passive verb that in turn subcategorises an infinitival clause. In 
Spanish, the verb of that clause would be an impersonal form that 
subcategorises a finite complement clause introduced by the complementiser 
‘que’. Additionally, for the defining relative clause to be licensed in 
Spanish, the initial noun –e.g. ‘killer’– needs subtituting with another one –
e.g. ‘person’, ‘man’: 
(57) a. The man who is alleged/supposed to be the/a killer has been sent to 
prison. 
b. El hombre que se supone/cree que es un homicida ha sido enviado a 
prisión. 
These formal and transformational differences reveal that the scope of 
hearsay adverbials is the whole asserted proposition, whereas that of 
evidential participles is only a part of the asserted proposition. Therefore, 
hearsay adverbials instruct epistemic vigilance mechanisms to be cautious 
about the veracity of a whole proposition, while evid ntial participles alert 
those mechanisms to the likely untruthfulness of a state of affairs alluded to 





Comprehension is assisted by a number of linguistic and paralinguistic 
elements that include discourse markers, attitudinal adverbials, interjections 
or intonation. Languages also count on other devices that enable informers 
to warn about the believability of information: hears y particles and 
adverbials, evidential adverbials, some main verbs and parenthetical 
expressions. Generally labelled evidentials, these d vices indicate 
informers’ benevolence and level of competence in some domain or issue. 
This chapter has looked into a group of past participles which, unlike 
prototypical ones, do not have adjectival functions but work as evidentials. 
Evidential past participles, as they are termed in this chapter, encode a 
conceptual content that contributes to the truth-conditional content of the 
proposition where they appear, but they also encode procedural meaning. 
Like hearsay adverbials, evidential participles have been argued to target the 
cluster of mechanisms responsible for an attitude of epistemic vigilance. 
They enact the activation of those mechanisms or increase their activation, 
which results in external vigilance of preceding or upcoming discourse. 
Active vigilance is essential for avoiding (indiscriminate) gullibility and 
adopting the sceptical trust indispensable for the formation and fixation of 
accurate beliefs.  
While hearsay adverbials take within their scope the w ole proposition they 
are appended to, the scope of evidential participles is more limited. It only is 
a fragment of an asserted proposition: a nominal hed. This means that 
evidential participles alert vigilance mechanisms to the fact that the referent 
of a nominal expression alluded to in the asserted proposition should not be 
taken as responsible for a particular state of affairs or to the fact that the 
state of affairs referred to by means of a noun maynot actually hold as true 
at the moment when an assertion is made because of lack of adequate 
evidence or unreliability of available evidence. As a result, the audience is 
not entitled to derive and regard as true some implications that may follow 
from the assertion made. Thus, evidential participles suggest that it would 
only be in the (near) future, and provided that reliable evidence is adduced, 
that a nominal referent could definitely be considere  responsible for a 
particular state of affairs, or a state of affairs lluded to could be believed to 
actually hold. 
This function could also intertwine with another one: marking interpretive 
use. Evidential participles would somehow show thate noun with which 
they occur is not descriptively used or should not be hus used at the 
moment of speaking or writing. If it was, its referent could in effect be 
considered responsible for the state of affairs in question, or the state of 
affairs alluded to through that noun would actually hold. What evidential 
participles indicate is that the nominal referent is or will be considered in a 
particular manner by certain people if certain circumstances eventually or 
ultimately applied. To put it differently, evidential participles indicate that 
the referent is considered or believed by certain people to actually have 
certain characteristics or to likely have them in the (near) future provided 
certain circumstances applied. The activation of vigilance mechanisms 
surely depends on this marking of interpretive use, a dependence that future 
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